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Abstract 
When income growth under price dispersion reduces the time of search and raises prices of 
purchases, the increase in purchase price can be presented as the increase in the willingness to 
pay for insurance or the willingness to pay for consumer credit. The optimal consumer decision 
represents the trade-off between the propensity to search for beneficial insurance or consumer 
credit, and marginal savings on insurance policy or consumer credit. Under price dispersion the 
indirect utility function takes the form of cubic parabola, where the risk aversion behavior ends 
at the saddle point of the comprehensive insurance or the complete consumer credit. The 
comparative static analysis of the saddle point of the utility function discovers the ambiguity of 
the departure from risk-neutrality. This ambiguity can produce the ordinary risk seeking 
behavior as well as mathematical catastrophes of Veblen-effect’s imprudence and over prudence 
of family altruism. The comeback to risk aversion is also ambiguous and it results either in 
increasing or in decreasing relative risk aversion. The paper argues that the decreasing relative 
risk aversion comes to the optimum quantity of money. 
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Introduction to indirect utility function of satisficing optimal decision 
The analysis of the consumption-leisure choice U=U(Q,H) with respect to the wage rate w and to 
the purchase price reduction and marginal savings got from the search, or to the value ∂P/∂S, has 
discovered many interesting phenomena. The satisficing consumer decision procedure ignores 
unacceptable high prices PS; it starts at the reservation level of labor income wL0 and finishes at 
the purchase price level PP=wL< wL0, where the satisficing procedure results in optimal decision 
because it equalizes marginal costs of search with its marginal benefit and that equality provides 
the maximization of the utility function (Malakhov 2014). The use of the truly relative price, i.e., 
purchase price PP with regard to the time of search S or to the given place of purchase, gives 
new economic explanations for some anomalies of behavior like endowment effect, sunk costs 
sensitivity, little pre-purchase search of big ticket items, and, finally, Veblen effect and money 
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illusion. From the point of view of the problem maxU(Q,H) subject to w/∂P/∂S|const=Q/∂L/∂S, 
where the value ∂P/∂Sconst represents the given place of purchase and the value ∂L/∂S represents 
the propensity to search, i.e., propensity to substitute labor L for search S, the constraint is 
produced by the core equality of marginal values of search: 
w ∂L
∂S
=Q ∂P
∂S
(1)  
The equilibrium price Pe becomes equal to the sum of consumers’ labor costs wL and transaction 
cost wS, or Pe=w(L+S): 
∂U / ∂H
∂U / ∂Q
= −
w
∂P / ∂S
∂2L / ∂S∂H = − w
T∂P / ∂S
=
w
w(L+ S)
=
w
Pe
(2)  
where the value T=1/∂2L/∂S∂H represent the time horizon until the similar purchase, or the 
commodity lifecycle. 
As we can see, the Equation (2) specifies the paradox formulated by P.Diamond that when 
search costs are positive the equilibrium price is becomes equal to the monopoly price (Diamond 
1971). Moreover, the Equation (2) gives another view on home production where G.Becker’s 
model is still the dominant vector of analysis. Indeed, if we consider the household activity to be 
a specific form of search, the equilibrium price for the final product or the willingness to accept 
will be equal to the sum of purchase price of inputs PP, i.e., of labor costs wL, and transformation 
costs wS. 
Although the original values of the model ∂P/∂S and ∂L/∂S look unusual, their modeling tries not 
to forget the testament of A.Marshall, who told that “when a great many symbols have to be 
used, they become very laborious to any one but the writer himself” (Marshall 1920[1890], p.12). 
Sometimes such relative values are indispensable, especially when the original G.Stigler’s 
assumption of the diminishing marginal efficiency of search (Stigler 1961) is used (∂P/∂S<0; 
∂2P/∂S2>0), or when the behavior of the propensity to search is derived ((∂L/∂S<0; ∂2L/∂S2<0) 
(Malakhov 2014). However, the understanding of these relative values can be simplified by the 
graphical illustration of the interrelation between static (∂P/∂Sconst) implicit optimal decision and 
dynamic (∂P/∂Svariable) explicit satisficing decision (Fig.1): 
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Fig.1. Implicit optimal decision and explicit satisficing decision 
The presentation of relatives values in absolute terms, |∂P/∂S| and |∂L/∂S| facilitates their 
mathematical treatment without logical losses. This tactic facilitates the comparative static 
analysis and we can easily derive marginal utilities of money income and money expenditures 
with respect to optimal values of consumption and leisure (Malakhov 2013): 
MUw = λ; (3.1)
MU |∂P/∂S| = −λ
w
|∂P / ∂S |
(3.2)
 
The analysis of the second order cross partial derivatives, i.e, the change in the marginal utility 
of received money income with the change of the place of purchase, or ∂MUw /∂|∂P/∂S|, and the 
change in the marginal utility (disutility) of the habitual place of purchase with the change in 
money income, or ∂MU|∂P/∂S| /∂w, results in the equation that demonstrates the behavior of the 
marginal utility of money under the optimal consumption-leisure choice: 
eλ,|∂P/∂S| + eλ,w = e|∂P/∂S|.w -1   (4)  
Under the assumption of the diminishing efficiency of search the elasticity of price reduction 
e|∂P/∂S|.w  illustrates both the increase in the willingness to overpay and the decrease in time of 
search after the increase in the wage rate (|∂Pi/∂Si|>|∂Pj/∂Sj|è Pi>Pj;Si<Sj). Hence, it is always 
positive. When the value of the elasticity of price reduction e|∂P/∂S|.w is equal to one, we have 
eλ,|∂P/∂S| + eλ,w = 0   (5) 
The Equation (4) also enlightened the way for the comparative static analysis of the indirect 
utility function where subsequent satisficing decisions optimize consumption-leisure trade-offs 
with respect to changes in both parts of the constraint. The increase in the wage rate moves 
consumers from low-price stores to high-price stores. Indeed, the Equation (4) shows us that the 
indirect utility function depends on two variables in the following manner: 
v(w,|∂P/∂S|)= v(w,|∂P/∂S|(w))     (6) 
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The total derivative of this utility function gives us the following: 
dv(w,|∂P / ∂S | (w)) = dw( ∂v
∂w
||∂P/∂S|const +
∂v
∂ |∂P / ∂S |
∂ |∂P / ∂S |
∂w
); (7)
dv
dw
= λ −λ
w
|∂P / ∂S |
∂ |∂P / ∂S |
∂w
= λ(1− e|∂P/∂S|,w )
 
We see that when the price reduction is unit elastic (e|∂P/∂S|.w=1), the Equation (5) takes place and 
the utility stays constant, or dv/dw=0. And the following choice of the purchase price which is 
accompanied by a greater price reduction (e|∂P/∂S|.w>1) decreases the utility of consumption-
leisure choice. 
 
Willingness to overpay as insurance premium 
Usually, guarantees and insurance contracts increase both prices of purchases and price 
dispersion and we can await that guarantees and insurance contracts raise the equilibrium price 
reduction |∂P/∂S| that equalizes marginal costs of search with its marginal benefit.  
We can assume that the increase in the wage rate results not in the simple increase in the 
purchase price with respect to the increased income but in the increase in the insurance 
premium, accompanied by the increase in price reduction. The consumer details his insurance 
policy and increases the insurance premium with every increase in the wage rate. Our 
assumption is really illustrative because here the consumer behaves like a homeowner who 
raises progressively the fence with any subsequent increase in income. And more insurance 
policies are detailed, the more efficient is the search, i.e., the greater is the absolute value of the 
equilibrium price reduction. 
The appearance of the saddle point in the utility function gives an answer to the question what 
the consumer should do in order to avoid the decrease in utility. Obviously, he should decrease 
relative price reduction i.e., to be… not more modest, but less ambitious with regard to purchase 
prices after the following increase in the wage rate. We see that the decrease in the willingness to 
overpay is really possible. The only way to increase both consumption and real balances is not to 
reduce absolute overpayments (the value ∂|∂P/∂S|/∂w is always positive) but to reduce relative 
overpayments, or to make them less income elastic, i.e., e|∂P/∂S|.w=0,9; 0,8; 0,7… etc., other 
words, to accept incomplete insurance and guarantees for items to be bought. 
However, this change represents the change in the model of behavior – from risk aversion to risk 
seeking. Indeed, the prospect theory tells us that facing the inevitable loss, here the decrease in 
utility, the consumer should take risk (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Hence, the utility function 
changes its shape and becomes close to the cubic parabola (Fig.2). 
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Fig.2. Utility function under price dispersion 
 
Unwillingness to overpay for insurance as driver of risk behavior 
When we determine the second derivative of the utility function, we should keep in mind the 
marginal utility of money income λ as well as the unwillingness to overpay (1-e|∂P/∂S|.w) also 
represent functions of two variables. We can omit labor-intensive intermediate calculations and 
present the second derivative directly in its total form and in its elasticity form: 
d 2v
dw2
=
dλ
dw
(1− e|∂P/∂S|,w )+λ
d(1− e|∂P/∂S|,w )
dw
(8) 	  
d 2v
dw2
=
λ
w
(1− e|∂P/∂S|,w )(eλ ,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S|e|∂P/∂S|,w + e(1−e|∂P/∂S|,w),w ) (9)  
The form of the total second derivative is very useful for the step-by-step analysis of changes in 
the model of behavior. The elasticity form, although its use is limited by critical points, is helpful 
in the derivation of the relative measure of risk aversion and in following optional high-order 
derivations of measures of prudence, which are omitted from the present analysis and left for 
analysts who are not afraid to work with relative values of the model. Thus, the relative Arrow-
Pratt measure takes the following form: 
η = −(eλ ,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S|e|∂P/∂S|,w + e(1−e|∂P/∂S|,w),w ) (10)  
Although we get here the second order elasticity, it is rather simple to understand it. We can 
denote the value (1-e|∂P/∂S|.w) as the unwillingness to overpay and consider its elasticity with 
respect to the wage rate. When the increase in wage rate decreases the unwillingness to overpay, 
the second derivative d2v/dw2 is strictly negative. Moreover, while the unwillingness to overpay 
is decreasing, the absolute value of its elasticity e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w is increasing.  And with the 
increase in absolute value of the elasticity of the unwillingness to overpay the relative risk 
aversion is increasing, i.e., the share of risky assets, i.e., unsecured consumption, is decreasing. 
Of course, it certainly happens because the subsequent growth in the wage rate and in the 
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equilibrium value of price reduction always results in the increase in real balances, which follow 
the optimal consumption path of the indirect utility function. It means that the total elasticity of 
the marginal utility of money is negative, or (eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w) <0. The last assumption can 
be verified by the following transformation with the help of the Equation (4): 
eλ ,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S|e|∂P/∂S|,w = eλ ,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S|e|∂P/∂S|,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S| − eλ ,|∂P/∂S| = (e|∂P/∂S|,w −1)(1+ eλ ,|∂P/∂S| ) (11)  
The price reduction elasticity of the marginal utility of money is positive, or eλ,|∂P/∂S|>0, because 
it simply states the growth in the marginal utility of money with increase in price of purchase. 
Hence, the Equation (11) shows us that, when e|∂P/∂S|.w <1, any increase in wage rate raises real 
balances and decreases the marginal utility of money because the total elasticity of the marginal 
utility of money is negative, or (eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w) <0.  
The behavior of the utility function at this stage is described by the following expressions: 
1-e|∂P/∂S|.w >0; λ >0; dλ/dw<0; de(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w/dw<0è d2v/dw2<<0     (12) 
Here the relative risk aversion is increasing because the consumer raises the overpayments or, in 
the case of insurance, makes the latter more and more detailed. The homeowner begins with 
insurance for the house and he details it with furniture and paintings. Once there is no object to 
be insured except the coffer with cash. And the consumer insures it by the following increase in 
the wage rate and he spends on the coffer’s insurance the total increase in income. This action 
means that neither consumption nor cash kept in the coffer are changed. The insurance policy 
becomes full or comprehensive. The elasticity of price reduction becomes equal to one 
(e|∂P/∂S|.w=1), the unwillingness to overpay becomes equal to zero (e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w =0), and, 
according to the Equation (5), the increasing marginal utility of money expenditures completely 
offsets the decreasing marginal utility of money income:  
eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w= eλ,|∂P/∂S| + eλ,w = 0     (13) 
This stationary point B also represents the decision node (Fig.2). If the consumer decides to re-
insure his comprehensive insurance (e|∂P/∂S|.w>1) for the given level of consumption, he will 
decrease his real balances. The utility function will go down (dv/dw<0). Thus, the only way to 
increase both consumption and real balances is to accept incomplete insurance and guarantees 
for items to be bought. 
This decision is the result of the increase in the unwillingness to overpay e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w. However, 
when the increase in the wage rate raises the unwillingness to overpay, the second derivative 
d2v/dw2 becomes positive. The consumer begins to seek risk: 
1-e|∂P/∂S|.w >0; λ >0; dλ/dw<0; de(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w/dw>>0;d2v/ dw2>0     (14) 
It happens because at the beginning the positive elasticity of the unwillingness to overpay 
outweighs the total negative elasticity of the marginal utility of money, or  
(eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w) + e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w  >0. 
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Here we need some comments on the relationship between real balances and overpayments. The 
risk-seeking behavior means that the increase in consumption is not well secured. However, the 
insurance is provided not only by insurance policy but also by real balances, which could 
represent the precautionary savings. The risk-seeking model of behavior means that the total of 
precautionary savings and insurance policy is insufficient for the optimal level of consumption. 
It happens because here the relative increase in real balances is followed by the relative decrease 
in overpayments. Real balances as the tool of protection of consumption, i.e., of wealth, begin to 
substitute overpayments. 
Here we come to the question whether precautionary savings and insurance are substitutes or 
complements. In spite of some analytical solutions of this problem (Ehrlich and Becker (1972)), 
this question is still open in the general economic analysis. Moreover, when this issue is studied, 
the attention is usually paid to health and social insurance (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), 
Guariglia and Rossi (2004)). Here we can only assume the substitutability between money 
balances and overpayments. The only reason for this assumption is the response of relative 
overpayments to the continuous decrease in the value of λ, i.e., in the marginal utility of 
increasing real balances. The economic sense of the decrease in the relative overpayments with 
respect to the decrease in the marginal utility of money, i.e., in the “price” of money, presumes 
the substitutability. In addition, the increase in relative overpayments with respect to the 
decrease in the marginal utility of money presumes that when the consumer is risk-averse, real 
balances and overpayments becomes complements from the standpoint of the protection of 
wealth. In any way, the rather harmonic assumption that precautionary savings and insurance are 
complements in the risk-aversion model and they are substitutes in the risk-seeking model needs, 
and we are going to see it, more profound analysis. 
The comeback from risk seeking to risk aversion is ambiguous. While the positive elasticity of 
the unwillingness to overpay e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w  is decreasing, once it certainly matches the total 
negative elasticity of the marginal utility of money: 
(eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w) + e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w  =0     (14) 
The analysis of the second derivative of the utility function discovers two possible outcomes 
from the risk neutrality. While the total elasticity of the marginal utility of money is always 
negative (eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w<0), the model of behavior depends here on the decision whether 
to continue to decrease relative overpayments and to increase the unwillingness to overpay (e(1-
e|∂P/∂S|.w),w>0), or to increase relative overpayments and to decrease the unwillingness to overpay 
(e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w<0). The continuous increase in real balances with the negative total elasticity of 
the marginal utility of money (eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w<0) provides the negative second derivative 
d2v/dw2<0  for both outcomes. However, the continuous increase in the unwillingness to 
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overpay, i.e., in the unwillingness to detail insurance policy, results in the “steeper” sortie from 
the risk neutrality. We can verify this fact without laborious calculations of high-order 
derivatives but with simple back-on-the envelope sketch. The continuous increase in the 
unwillingness to overpay (e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w>0) simply states the fact that the consumer relies more 
on precautionary savings than on insurance and he increases the share of risky assets, i.e., the 
share of uninsured commodities or, more precisely, the share of commodities with incomplete 
insurance and guarantees. Hence, his relative risk aversion becomes decreasing. On the other 
hand, if he chooses the extension of insurance policy or the decrease in the unwillingness to 
overpay, he increases his risk aversion. The option to decrease the unwillingness to overpay and 
to detail insurance policies (e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w<0)  results in the flat transformation of the utility curve. 
And with the increasing relative risk aversion the consumer comes again to the next saddle point 
with the unit elasticity of the price reduction e|∂P/∂S|.w=1 that represents the next decision node 
(Fig.3): 
v(w)
w
e(1−e|∂P/∂S|,w) <0
e(1−e|∂P/∂S|,w)>0 M
 
Fig.3.Decreasing vs. increasing relative risk aversion 
The path of the decreasing relative risk aversion is more intriguing. There, the consumer can 
continue to decrease relative overpayments until the moment when the value of price reduction 
|∂P/∂S| becomes definitely constant. At this moment the elasticity of the unwillingness to pay e(1-
e|∂P/∂S|.w),w  as well as the elasticity of price reduction e|∂P/∂S|.w becomes equal to zero, and the 
derivatives of the utility function gets its “true” values, or dv/dw=λ and d2v/dw2=dλ/dw, i.e., the 
marginal utility of income becomes unit elastic. Evidently, the marginal utility of money λ is 
equal here to the opportunity costs of holding cash. However, while the value of price reduction 
|∂P/∂S| doesn’t affect here the marginal utility of money in dynamics because its elasticity is 
equal to zero, it doesn’t disappear at all and continues to bother the consumer by its constant 
value. Here, this residual constant |∂P/∂S| value represents the prolongation of the insurance 
policy for the coffer, leaving all other wealth unsecured. 
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The insurance for the coffer simply substitutes the costs of illiquidity in the model of the 
precautionary demand for cash (Whalen 1966, p.316). Thus, the “true” value of money is 
decreased by the costs of guarding the cash. This assumption corresponds to M.Friedman’s 
reasoning on the optimum quantity of money:  
“The amount held will, at the margin, reduce utility – because of concern about the safety of the 
cash, perhaps, or because of pecuniary costs of storing and guarding the cash.” (Friedman 2005 
[1969], p.18). 
Indeed, if the consumer follows this path once he could come to the point M of the optimum 
quantity of money. The volume of precautionary saving with respect to consumption becomes so 
important that it protects the wealth against any disaster. However, if the marginal utility of the 
optimum quantity of money equals to zero, the consumer doesn’t need to insure it.  
These considerations raises the question why the consumer cannot change the manner of risk 
aversion and get the “true” value of money at low levels of income, i.e., why the shift from the 
increasing to the decreasing risk aversion cannot take place at low values of relative 
overpayments e|∂P/∂S|.w<<1. Moreover, it seems that in this case the consumer could avoid saddle 
points and he could reproduce the exact contour of the Friedman-Savage’s utility function 
(Friedman and Savage 1948). However, in this case high values of the marginal utility of real 
balances of low income levels could hardly be offset by the marginal decrease in the 
unwillingness to overpay and the consumer will come to the saddle point where he will meet 
“catastrophic” consequences of both imprudence and over prudence. 
 
Economic and mathematical catastrophes: Veblen effect and family altruism 
When G.Becker issued his famous rationalization of family altruism, he stressed the importance 
of the role of security:  
Therefore, altruism helps families insure their members against disasters and other 
consequences of uncertainty: each member of an altruistic family is partly insured because all 
other members are induced to bear some of the burden through changes in contributions from 
the altruist (Becker 1981, pp.3-4).  
Hence, the family altruism can be introduced in our model as an additional insurance. There are 
two possible outcomes for this extra insurance from the saddle point. 
We can reproduce the decrease in the individual utility function of the head of the family when 
relative overpayments really become disproportionate to his individual security, or e|∂P/∂S|.w>1. 
The extra insurance is provided by the decrease in real balances (∂λ/∂w>0). However, the 
following set of equations demonstrates that the decrease in utility (∂v/∂w<0) is accompanied 
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there not by the risk-seeking behavior but by risk-aversion (∂2v/∂w2<0). The utility function 
takes the form of parabola: 
1-e|∂P/∂S|.w >0; λ >0; dλ/dw>0; de(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w/dw<<0èd2v/dw2<0     (15) 
Here we could wait for the moment when money balances become equal to zero and the family 
changes her model of behavior. Unfortunately, in the absence of budget constraints the family 
could borrow. In this case the marginal utility of money income λ becomes negative. However, 
when the marginal utility of money income λ becomes negative the head of the family can 
increase his utility if he continues to increase overpayments (λ<0; (1-e|∂P/∂S|.w) <0;dv/dw>0). 
Here the head of the family reproduces the Veblen effect. The previous analysis discovered the 
correspondence between negative marginal utility of money and the extra overpayments 
(Malakhov 2013). This is the first “pitfall” the stationary point B prepares for imprudent 
consumers. Moreover, from the individual point of view the Veblen-effect-like leaving of the 
saddle point looks more positive than the increase in the unwillingness to overpay. This way can 
provide more utility until the moment when real balances will be exhausted or the borrowing 
will be closed and the comeback either to risk aversion or to risk-seeking behavior will take 
place (Fig.4). In addition, only here we can definitely talk about maximizing behavior. Indeed, if 
the aspiration level motivates the consumer to get from the search more than from the labor, i.e., 
to get marginal savings on purchase greater than the wage rate, the consumer immediately 
follows the Veblen effect (Malakhov 2013): 
v(w)
w
Risk%seeking)
Veblen)eﬀect)
В"
 
Fig.4.The option of Veblen effect in risk-seeking behavior 
The equilibrium at the saddle point B is unstable. The consumer can take either maximizing or 
satisficing decision. The maximizing decision results in the Veblen effect and the satisficing 
decision produces the ordinary risk seeking behavior. However, the maximizing decision is the 
decision to purchase a “bad” item with negative marginal utility due to the value λ<0. The rules 
of the optimization of consumption-leisure stop working, the constraint line takes the north-east 
direction, and the increase in utility happens only due to an important increase in leisure time 
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that increases the purchase price and compensates the consumption of “bad” item. It really 
happens when imprudent young family considers holidays on the seaside or in mountains to be 
vital and parents agree to sponsor vacations for grandchildren. Hélas, in the search model of 
behavior even skiing might become “bad”. 
The occurrence of Veblen effect with regard to the previous reasoning on the optimum quantity 
of money tells us that Veblen effect can take place at rather modest levels of income where 
consumption is far from satiation. However, although this scenario can take place, it does not 
seem well compatible with the description of the individual utility function within the family. 
There is another possibility to present family altruism. We can pretend the head of the family to 
be more “economic man” and to separate altruism from the individual utility function. If we take 
the factor of giving as the share of the individual wage rate, we get the following utility function 
vg(w)=v(w)-gw. However, there we automatically get the other “pitfall” or the mathematical 
“bold”-type catastrophe due to the existence of the saddle point B and to its unstable equilibrium 
in the original utility function (Fig.5): 
vg (w);
dvg dw
w
vg (w)
dvg dw
A" B" C" D"
 
Fig.5.”Bold” catastrophe of family altruism 
In this case the decrease in the utility function starts at point A when the consumer, the head of 
the family, is still risk averse and he continues to make protection of his wealth by the increasing 
real balances and by increasing overpayments. The continuous increase in overpayments 
discovers the unwillingness of the head of the family to economize. Here, the behavior looks like 
“pure” altruism. However, once the head of the family changes the model of his behavior and he 
begins to make risky decisions. It happens at point B when he passes the saddle point of the 
original utility function with the unit elastic price reduction (e|∂P/∂S|.w=1). The following 
increasing unwillingness to overpay gives an idea that the nature of his altruism has been 
changed. The head of the family becomes more “pragmatic”.  Although his altruism does not 
exhausted, his purchase decisions become more prudent. They begin to look like investments. 
The investments in family reach its peak at point C. Finally, the head of the family begins to feel 
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again the increase in his utility function and at point D he no longer suffers from his altruism, or 
he finally gets returns on investments: 
“Altruistic parents might not have more children than selfish parents, but they invest more in the 
human capital or quality of children because the utility of altruistic parents is raised by 
investment returns that accrue to their children.” (Becker 1981, p.12). 
Indeed, the movement of the utility curve from point A to point D reminds the parental behavior 
from the birth of a child till the go-out of a young man from the nest. At the beginning parents do 
not economize on purchases for babies. They are trying to buy everything of high quality and 
with guarantees. Once, at point B, these purchases take the form of investments, which even in 
prudent manner lead to point C in the bottom due to their importance. However, the earlier 
decision at point B to reduce relative overpayments continues to work and finally it pulls out the 
head of the family from the “pitfall”. 1 
 
Interest rate and willingness to overpay for consumer credit 
The common question addressed to the model presented here why it doesn’t follow the original 
G.Stigler’s presentation of the equality of marginal values of search with respect to the interest 
rate. Indeed, the core equation of the model could be presented in that manner: 
i×w ∂L
∂S
=Q ∂P
∂S
(16)  
However, even G.Stigler agreed, that interest rate made “expected reduction in price…be smaller 
than the smallest unit of currency” (Stigler 1961, p.219). While the dynamic of the satisficing 
decision procedure is short, the model assumes that consumers usually ignore interest rate during 
the search. If the satisficing consumer doesn’t calculate marginal values of search, why he 
should compute decimals of interest rate and of probabilities? 
However, the methodological concern about interest rate can be gratified if we envisage the risk 
of delay of consumption, i.e., the risk of unexpected rise in prices, and explain overpayments as 
payments for consumer credit. Other words, interest rate increases price dispersion as well as 
marginal savings on purchase. The greater is an item under consumer credit, the greater are the 
marginal savings on this purchase. In this case the comprehensive insurance is transformed into 
the comprehensive consumer credit and the extra comprehensive insurance (e|∂P/∂S|.w>1) is 
transformed into the refinancing of existing debt.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 When G.Becker cited King Lear’s Fool in order to illustrate the Rotten Kid Theorem by the parental willingness to 
delay contributions until last stage of life he did not take into account the possibility of saddle points in the parental 
utility function. We have seen that if the consumer continues to increase overpayments without change in the model 
of behavior at the saddle point his utility goes down infinitely.  Once upon a time King Lear simply missed that 
point. And from the literature point of view it would be better here to remember d’Artagnan-father, who contributed 
to his son only quinze écus, his horse, and some parental advices.  
 
	   13	  
When the consumer buys an item against coming increase in the wage rate it means that the 
value e|∂P/∂S|.w=1 also is coming. This consideration with respect to consumer credit tells us that 
saddle point is more common economic phenomenon than it was seen from the point of view of 
insurance. People hold cash for everyday expenses where the cash represents the residual of 
interest payments. And at e|∂P/∂S|.w=1 level the total increase in income is going to finance the 
debt. Neither consumption nor real balances are changed. After that, if the consumer wants to 
buy another big-ticket item he should either refinance current debt or to search this item more 
intensively in order to decrease relative overpayments, i.e., to find more beneficial credit for the 
new purchase. The first way decreases the utility and the second way increases risk of 
unexpected rise in prices during the search.  
We remember that while the positive elasticity of the unwillingness to overpay e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w  is 
decreasing, once it certainly matches the total negative elasticity of the marginal utility of money 
and the second derivative of the utility function becomes equal to zero, or d2v/dw2=0. The 
following increase in the wage rate again gives a chance to expand consumer credit by the 
increase in relative overpayments. Facing price uncertainty, the consumer chooses this way of 
the increasing relative risk aversion. But we already know that real balances at this moment can 
also protect consumption. If the consumer chooses the decreasing relative risk aversion path, 
once overpayments become definitely constant. Here, the constant |∂P/∂S| value of consumer 
credit could mean that products are delivered every day by a boy from the neighboring grocery 
store and once a month the consumer signs a check to the grocer like he renews the insurance 
policy for the coffer every year. 
The constant |∂P/∂S| value and the constant place of purchase mean that the consumer is 
satiated by items that could be bought in other places, i.e., by items that could produce another 
marginal savings on purchase.  
In addition, the consumer also can get the optimum quantity of money but he should decrease for 
that liquidity costs to the zero level, for example, to give to the grocer a right to debit his current 
account. With that the consumer reproduces the optimal precautionary model of money holdings 
– credit is not used, liquidity costs are zero, and the marginal utility of money also equals to zero 
(Fenestra 1986, p. 283). 
However, this theoretical assumption is really illustrative. There are more realistic paths and 
both of them are well known to us because they represent “catastrophic” solutions. Coming to 
very low values of the marginal utility of money, either the consumer buys an extraordinary item 
and, therefore, increases the time of leisure to consume it or he starts the practice of charity that 
might take a form of the sponsorship for venture investments. 
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Conclusion 
The analysis of consumer behavior presented in this paper discovers the methodological power 
of relative values, which are produced by the process of search. The consumer’s search for 
beneficial price reduction can be interpreted as the search for reduction in insurance or in interest 
payments.  
The motivation to reduce time of search and to increase quality in consumption after the increase 
in the wage rate inevitably leads a consumer to the saddle point of the utility function. And the 
equilibrium in the saddle point is unstable. The consumer can follow maximizing path where he 
produces the Veblen effect or he can follow common satisficing path where he should take risk. 
However, even the satisficing path comes to the economic catastrophe of the decrease in utility if 
consumer takes into account the factor of giving or family altruism. 
The model also provides a graphical difference between increasing and decreasing relative risk 
aversion. The increasing relative risk aversion path could come to the new saddle point of 
comprehensive insurance or complete consumer credit and the decreasing relative risk aversion 
could come to the optimum quantity of money. 
In addition, this approach can revive the discussion on the optimum quantity of money with an 
interesting argument. Indeed, when overpayments become constant they could represent not 
direct interest payments but some fixed expenditures the consumer pays to the government to 
finance the interest payments on money (Bewley 1983, Mehrling 1995).  
The question of the limp-sum taxation leads to the understanding that the model presented here 
could be useful in the analysis of the optimal taxation. If we substitute in the individual utility 
function the factor of giving by income tax we also get the “bold”-type catastrophe. However, if 
one tries to go further and to explain overpayments by VAT or excise tax, the coming trade-off 
between income taxes and overpayments should be examined with prudence.  
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